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Introduction 
 
 
Shrinking Spaces in Israel 
Contraction of Democratic Space, Consolidation of Occupation, and Ongoing Human 
Rights Violations Call for a Paradigm Shift in Europe’s Policies 
Muriel Asseburg 
Israel has always claimed to be the only democracy in the Middle East. Yet the current 
government coalition is dominated by right-wing, ultra-Orthodox and national-religious 
parties advocating illiberal policies and seeking Jewish dominance across “Eretz Israel” 
– Israel itself and the occupied Palestinian territories. Accordingly, the government 
is working firstly to emphasise the Jewish elements in Israel’s identity. It is secondly 
pushing ahead with settlement-building in and de facto annexation of parts of the 
occupied territories. Thirdly, it is steadily shrinking the spaces for Israel’s civil society 
and human rights organisations. Germany and the EU should press Israel to comply 
with international law, improve the human rights situation and preserve spaces for 
civil society to thrive. In their policies, working towards respect for human rights and 
international law should no longer come second to conflict resolution. 
 
Israel attaches great importance to being 
regarded as the only democracy in the 
Middle East and the West’s partner of choice. 
It does truly stand out from other countries 
in the region, offering its citizens regular 
free and fair elections, an effective division 
of powers, and functioning checks and bal-
ances. In recent years, however, the scope for 
civil society actors has shrunk considerably. 
Individuals and institutions who express 
critical positions on Israel’s policies in the 
occupied territories, human rights violations, 
and the country’s identity are especially af-
fected by repressive legislation and massive 
defamation and intimidation campaigns. 
In July 2016 the Knesset passed the so-
called NGO Transparency Law requiring 
non-governmental organisations that re-
ceive more than half of their funding from 
foreign state entities to report the origins 
of their grants and publicise the fact in 
various specified contexts. The legislation 
primarily targets organisations that criti-
cise the Israeli government’s occupation 
policies, argue for equality for Israel’s non-
Jewish citizens, and defend human rights, 
including those of refugees. The Justice 
Ministry published a list of 27 NGOs that 
receive more than 50 percent of their 
funding from foreign state entities. Right-
leaning NGOs, think tanks, and media 
outlets as well as settler organisations, etc. 
are funded almost entirely through private 
donations and as such unaffected by the 
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law’s provisions. Even though the legisla-
tion itself does not directly restrict freedom 
of expression and assembly, the debate ac-
companying the legislative process made it 
very clear that it is designed to stigmatise 
particular NGOs as agents of foreign inter-
ests. 
The efforts to clamp down on critical 
voices in Israel continue. Various draft bills 
currently before the Knesset would further 
tighten the constraints on NGOs. Measures 
under consideration include charging 
the relevant NGOs for public information 
requests, banning particular organisations, 
requiring the NGOs to be labelled as “for-
eign agents”, and taxing funding from 
foreign state entities. In June 2017 Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced 
a draft bill that would prohibit Israeli 
NGOs from accepting any funding at all 
from foreign state entities. 
Above all, aggressive campaigns against 
human rights organisations have prolifer-
ated in recent years. Right-leaning politi-
cians, think tanks and NGOs (such as NGO 
Monitor and Im Tirtzu), as well as media 
close to the prime minister, have branded 
such NGOs traitors, terrorist collaborators, 
and foreign agents, and their staff have 
been threatened, in some cases massively. 
Such attacks have concentrated especially 
on those that cooperate with United Nations 
and International Criminal Court investiga-
tions into human rights violations and war 
crimes. It is above all these campaigns that 
are the most important impediment to the 
activities of Israeli civil society, peace move-
ment and human rights defenders, as they 
are seriously delegitimising their work in 
the Israeli public sphere and burdening them 
with the costs of personal and IT security, 
legal response and defensive PR. 
The measures described above must be 
seen in connection with other laws and 
initiatives that also aim at silencing critical 
voices in Israeli public life – voices that chal-
lenge the official self-image of the Jewish 
state and the dominant interpretation of 
its history. These measures include the 
Nakba Law of March 2011, which provides 
for withdrawal of public funding from any 
organisation that concurs with the Palestin-
ian narrative that Israel’s struggle for in-
dependence was responsible for the forcible 
displacement of Palestinians, or partici-
pates in associated commemorations. The 
Expulsion Law of July 2016 enables depu-
ties accused of incitement, racism or sup-
port of armed struggle against the state to 
be excluded from parliament by a qualified 
majority, while the Anti-BDS Law of March 
2017 allows individuals who advocate a 
boycott of Israel or its settlements to be pre-
vented from entering the country. Already 
in March 2014, before the last general elec-
tion, the threshold for entry to the Knesset 
was raised from 2 to 3.25 percent to exclude 
those parties representing overwhelmingly 
Arab citizens. The manoeuvre failed after 
Hadash, Raam, Balad and Taal joined to 
form a single list. 
Discrimination 
Israel’s self-image as a “Jewish and demo-
cratic state” has always been characterised 
by internal tensions, manifested above all 
in discrimination against non-Jewish sec-
tions of the population. In 2003, in response 
to demographic trends, Israel banned immi-
gration and naturalisation of Palestinian 
spouses and family members from the occu-
pied Palestinian territories and so-called 
enemy states on principle. While the gov-
ernment and the high court (which con-
firmed the law in 2006 and 2012) justify 
this discrimination on the basis of security 
concerns, this problematic argument places 
all Palestinians under blanket suspicion. 
Non-Jews are disadvantaged in property 
matters too, with the Jewish National Fund 
(JNF), which owns about 13 percent of the 
land in Israel, leasing exclusively to Jews. 
The JNF also holds great sway over the 
decisions of the Israel Land Authority (ILA), 
which controls the state-owned land. Al-
together about 93 percent of the land is 
publicly owned – including a considerable 
proportion expropriated from Palestinians. 
In many towns and communities local 
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selection committees ensure that property 
is only leased or rented to those regarded as 
“suitable”. Municipality-level budget data 
also reveals that the government privileges 
the development of Jewish communities, 
for example by classifying them as National 
Priority Areas. Arab communities are sys-
tematically disadvantaged in terms of bud-
get funding and housing development. 
The treatment of the Arab Bedouins in the 
Negev Desert is especially problematic. 
Most of them live in unrecognised towns 
or villages that receive no or few public 
services and are frequently threatened or 
affected by housing demolition and forcible 
displacement. 
The attitudes of the Jewish majority to-
wards the Arab Palestinian minority who 
make up around one-fifth of the Israeli 
population have hardened over recent 
years, as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
drags on. Many Jewish Israelis regard 
Israel’s Palestinians as a “fifth column” 
on account of their identity and their rela-
tionships with Palestinians in the occupied 
territories and the rest of the Arab world. 
According to the Israeli Democracy Index 2016, 
46 percent of Jewish Israelis believe that 
Israeli Arabs want the destruction of the 
state of Israel; 43 percent regard them as 
a security risk. As a consequence, parts of 
the Jewish majority feel it is increasingly 
acceptable to restrict the civil and political 
rights of Israeli Arabs. Although 70 percent 
of Jewish Israelis believe that Arab citizens 
should share the same rights in principle, 
59 percent oppose allowing Arab parties to 
join the government. More than 52 percent 
in the survey said that anyone who refused 
to recognise Israel as the nation state of the 
Jewish people should lose the right to vote. 
A survey of Israeli youth by the German 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, published in Israel 
in April 2017, found that 39 percent of 
young Israeli Jews believe that Arab citizens 
should be denied the right to vote; only 
35 percent support full political equality. 
The current Israeli government is work-
ing to strengthen the specifically Jewish 
dimension of the country’s identity. In May 
2017 the Knesset passed the first reading 
of a Likud bill proposing a Basic Law that 
defines Israel as the “nation state of the 
Jewish people” where the “right to national 
self-determination” applies exclusively to 
Jews and Arabic is demoted from an official 
language to one with “special status”. 
Prolonged occupation 
While the non-Jewish citizens of Israel – even 
if they experience discrimination – possess 
full political rights, Palestinians in the occu-
pied Palestinian territories see their human 
rights regularly violated under the military 
occupation regime. After half a century, the 
occupation can no longer be regarded as 
temporary and justified by military neces-
sity in the sense of the Geneva Conventions. 
Evidence includes the de jure annexation 
of East Jerusalem and the systematic appro-
priation of parts of the West Bank through 
settlement-building, spatial planning and 
resource use. Rather it has become obvious 
that successive Israeli governments have in 
fact been working to permanently change 
the status of the occupied Palestinian terri-
tories through means including a continu-
ous transfer of Jewish citizens. There is thus 
a growing sense that the prolonged occupa-
tion itself violates international law – quite 
aside from the settlement policy, resource 
exploitation and other Israeli actions in the 
occupied territories. 
Since May 2015, when Netanyahu’s fourth 
government was sworn in, the intensity of 
Israeli settlement-building and destruction 
of Palestinian homes and infrastructure (for 
lack of construction permits or as collective 
punishment) has been strongly stepped up 
in strategically important areas of the West 
Bank. A June 2017 report by the research 
services of the German Bundestag calls the 
Israeli actions in the occupied territories 
“acts of displacement” because they aim 
“deliberately and systematically” to create 
an “inhospitable and forbidding environ-
ment hostile to development” for the Pales-
tinian population. The UN and the EU fear 
that the Israeli authorities’ measures in the 
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areas around Jerusalem (for example Zone 
E1), the South Hebron Hills and the Jordan 
Valley could even lead to forced displace-
ment of the local population. 
In February 2017 the Knesset opened the 
way for further de facto annexation of parts 
of the West Bank with the Law for the Regu-
lation of Settlement in Judea and Samaria 
(Regulation Law). It paves the way to legalise 
settlement outposts, which had previously 
been illegal even under Israeli law. It pro-
vides for the expropriation of privately 
owned Palestinian land on which outposts 
stand and expands Israeli law to parts of 
the West Bank. However, in August 2017 
the Regulation Law was blocked by Israel’s 
high court. In March 2017 – for the first 
time since 1992 – the Israeli cabinet ap-
proved the construction of an entirely new 
settlement north of Jerusalem. Finally, in 
July 2017 Prime Minister Netanyahu gave 
his blessing to a draft bill to expand Jeru-
salem’s administrative boundaries to in-
corporate settlements surrounding the 
city housing about 150,000 settlers (Gush 
Etzion, Efrat, Betar Illit, Givat Ze’ev and 
Ma’aleh Adumim). This would represent a 
de jure annexation of territory.  
Grave human rights violations 
Through its occupation-related policies, 
Israel violates the fundamental civil, politi-
cal and economic rights of the Palestinian 
population in the occupied territories. 
While it generally justifies these violations 
in terms of the security of Israel and its 
citizens, they often stem in fact from a 
drive to preserve the occupation regime 
and appropriate land and resources. 
A July 2004 advisory opinion of the Inter-
national Court of Justice thus regards the 
separation barrier built by Israel since 2002 
as contravening international law, because 
it stands largely within Palestinian terri-
tory, violates the right to self-determination 
of the Palestinians, appears to be intended 
to be permanent, and could as such serve a 
de facto annexation of territory. In conjunc-
tion with the settlement policy, the barrier 
thus violates various economic rights of the 
Palestinian population, not least the right 
to freedom of movement. Freedom of move-
ment is further hindered by the blockade 
of the Gaza Strip and the permit system for 
travel to East Jerusalem. 
Israel also retains the final say on all 
significant decisions concerning spatial 
planning and resource use in most of the 
West Bank – the so-called Area C which 
accounts for about 60 percent of its extent 
(see also SWP Comment 24/2016). Here 
Israel regularly makes decisions not in the 
interest of the Palestinian population – 
which would be its duty as occupying power 
– but favours its own population, including 
the settlers. The Palestinians are also denied 
access to the gas reserves off the coast of Gaza. 
An October 2013 World Bank study describes 
in detail how the development of the Pales-
tinian territories is obstructed by Israeli 
travel restrictions and other obstacles to 
resource utilisation and quantifies the boost 
to the growth of the Palestinian economy – 
more than 20 percent – that could be ex-
pected if the restrictions were lifted. 
In addition, the lives of the Palestinian 
population in the occupied territories (un-
like those of the Israeli settlers) are regulated 
by military decrees. Palestinian political 
activities are criminalised by the occupying 
power; the freedoms of assembly and organi-
sation are restricted. When settlers attack 
Palestinians or Palestinian property the 
Israeli army often fails to intervene or the 
perpetrators go unpunished – as docu-
mented for example by the Israeli human 
rights organisation B’Tselem. And dispro-
portionate force is frequently used against 
suspected terrorists and criminals and in 
clashes with demonstrators, leaving Pales-
tinian civilians dead or seriously injured. 
Palestinians in the occupied territories who 
are accused of acts of violence stand little 
chance of seeing their rights respected in 
the Israeli military courts; conversely, Pales-
tinian victims of violence rarely see Israeli 
perpetrators brought to justice. 
Conditions for Palestinian prisoners 
from the occupied territories fall short of 
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international standards. Alongside the 
large number of detainees, problematic 
issues include the routine transfer of pris-
oners to facilities outside the occupied 
territories (in contravention of internation-
al law), the systematic use of administrative 
detention (without indictment or trial, with 
a six-month limit but indefinitely extend-
able), and the prevalence of torture and 
abuse during detention and interrogation. 
In fact Israeli law forbids the use of “physi-
cal pressure” except in cases of imminent 
danger. However according to Amnesty 
International more than one thousand 
official complaints of torture were lodged 
between 2001 and 2016. In none of these 
cases, Amnesty notes, was a judicial inves-
tigation initiated. 
Making matters worse, Israel heavily 
restricts access for Palestinian, Israeli and 
international human rights representa-
tives, especially in the Gaza Strip. This 
makes it impossible to conduct independ-
ent investigations into human rights vio-
lations committed by the de-facto Hamas 
government and armed groups, nor into 
the grave war crimes of which militant 
Palestinian groups, the military wing of 
Hamas and Israel have been accused during 
the fighting in 2014. To date neither Israel 
(with a few exceptions) nor Hamas have 
conducted any serious investigations into 
war crimes. This raises doubts whether the 
authorities are willing and able to conduct 
credible investigations into war crimes. The 
answer to that question will be crucial in 
the International Criminal Court’s delibera-
tions on whether to open an investigation. 
Since January 2015 it has been conducting 
a preliminary examination into war crimes 
on both sides and the breaches of law re-
lated to settlement and occupation policies 
in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. 
Gaza crisis comes to a head 
Despite Israeli assertions to the contrary, 
the Gaza Strip remains under occupation. 
Although Israel evacuated all its settle-
ments and military facilities in late sum-
mer 2005, it continues to control Gaza’s 
land borders (with the exception since 2007 
of the border with Egypt), its sea borders, its 
territorial waters, its airspace and its elec-
tromagnetic spectrum (including its cell-
phone network). Additionally, the Israeli 
blockade – which was tightened in summer 
2006 following the kidnapping of the Israeli 
soldier Gilad Shalit and again in summer 
2007 after Hamas violently seized power – 
massively restricts the freedom of move-
ment of Gaza’s approximately 1.9 million 
residents in a manner tantamount to col-
lective punishment illegal under inter-
national law. And since the 2013 coup that 
brought General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to power 
in Cairo, the border crossing to Egypt has 
been all but closed. 
Sweeping import restrictions have pre-
vented comprehensive reconstruction of 
the damage caused by the 2014 fighting. 
The greatest impediment to rebuilding is 
Israel’s classification of construction ma-
terials and spare parts as dual-use goods 
whose import is regulated very tightly – 
even within the Gaza Reconstruction Mecha-
nism (GRM) established in September 2014. 
Cooperation with the GRM is problematic 
on principle insofar as it implicitly legiti-
mises the blockade. The international com-
munity (represented by the United Nations 
Special Coordinator for the Middle East 
Peace Process, UNSCO) assumes a role in 
implementing the blockade, rather than 
concentrating on the needs of the popula-
tion in the Gaza Strip and demanding the 
occupying power fulfil its duty to their 
well-being. 
Although UNSCO reported in May 2017 
that the reconstruction of public buildings 
and infrastructure has been largely com-
pleted – with the important exception of 
the fuel storage tanks at Gaza’s only power 
station – there are still about 40,000 inter-
nally displaced persons whose homes were 
destroyed or badly damaged in 2014. Even 
today, less than 60 percent of damaged pri-
vate homes have been reconstructed. 
At the same time, the UNSCO report 
stresses that physical reconstruction has 
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not led to a recovery of public services (still 
less to any improvement). Instead “de-devel-
opment” and environmental degradation 
have proliferated, increasing dependency 
on foreign aid. Economic upturn is not on 
the cards, because Israel’s restrictive line on 
export permits and access to agricultural 
land and fishing grounds leaves the local 
economy no chance to grow. About one-
third of Gaza’s agricultural land lies within 
the Israeli-imposed buffer zone and is there-
fore off-limits for farming. The fishing range, 
which the Oslo Agreements defined as 
twenty nautical miles from the coast, has 
been restricted to just between three and 
six nautical miles since 2006. Only occasion-
ally does Israel grant nine nautical miles. 
The upshot of all these factors is what 
has become a dramatic escalation of the 
humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip: 
according to UNSCO unemployment is 
around 40 percent, and 60 percent among 
20–24-year-olds. About two-thirds of the 
population are reliant on humanitarian 
aid. In summer 2017 electricity was avail-
able for only four hours a day on average, 
with grave repercussions in areas such as 
healthcare and water supplies. The dis-
charge of untreated sewage causes massive 
contamination of the coastal waters. If the 
problems of resource depletion and envi-
ronmental destruction are not addressed 
quickly, the UN believes that Gaza will be 
uninhabitable within just a few years. 
The internal Palestinian power struggle 
also bears a degree of responsibility for 
Gaza’s plight. For example, Israel further 
restricted electricity supplies in June 2017 
at the request of the Palestinian Authority 
(PA), which reduced its respective payments. 
Other measures taken by the PA since 
spring 2017 also seek to exert pressure on 
Hamas, whereas the brunt of their effects is 
borne by Gaza’s population. Otherwise the 
competing governments in Ramallah and 
Gaza City have both increasingly clamped 
down on political freedoms and in the pro-
cess committed gross human rights viola-
tions. They can no longer be described as 
democratic regimes. 
Policy options for Germany and the EU 
The narrowing of space for critical voices in 
Israel has been accompanied by a worsening 
of discrimination against the non-Jewish 
population and an entrenchment of the oc-
cupation of the Palestinian territories. The 
international community bears a portion of 
blame in these developments, above all for 
pursuing an approach to Israel (and the 
other parties to the conflict) that has priori-
tised the search for a negotiated settlement 
over insistence on human rights and inter-
national law. The failure to punish human 
rights violations and breaches of interna-
tional law by Israel, the PA and Hamas or 
to prosecute suspected war crimes is tanta-
mount to inviting the conflict parties to con-
tinue to break the law. Instead of creating 
the basis for peaceful coexistence, this 
deepens the rifts within and between the 
societies. In any case all states and inter-
national actors are legally obligated to deny 
recognition to internationally unlawful 
acts and to work for compliance with inter-
national law.  
Accordingly the foremost political objec-
tives for Germany and the EU should be to 
see international law respected, the human 
rights situation in Israel and the Palestini-
an territories improved and spaces for the 
articulation of civil society’s criticism and 
political opposition preserved. Fulfilling 
those demands would in no way distract 
from a negotiated settlement: in fact they 
would be preconditions for it to be sustain-
able. 
Upgrade of relations only if progress 
is made: Respect for human rights and 
democratic principles is an essential ele-
ment of the June 2000 Association Agree-
ment between the EU and Israel (Article 2). 
This offers the EU and its member states an 
opening to make discriminatory legislation 
and the narrowing of space for Israel’s civil 
society into central issues in their political 
dialogue with the Israeli government. An up-
grade of the relationship, as agreed in prin-
ciple in 2008, should be made conditional 
on tangible progress in the areas of democ-
racy, human rights and international law. 
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The EU and its member states should also 
cease undermining such a conditionality 
through a de facto deepening of coopera-
tion. 
Support for civil society, human rights 
advocates and investigators: Germany and 
its partners in the EU should insist that 
Israel grant access to human rights organi-
sations and UN special rapporteurs and 
investigators to conduct in situ investiga-
tions without hindrance, and that Israelis 
and Palestinians who cooperate with such 
investigations suffer no negative conse-
quences. Given the deteriorating climate, 
Germany and its European partners should 
offer consistent diplomatic and financial 
support to those defending human rights 
in Israel and the Palestinian territories. 
Consistent differentiation: In line with 
Security Council Resolution 2334 of Decem-
ber 2016, the EU and its member states 
need to distinguish more consistently than 
to date between their dealings with Israel 
and with the settlements in the occupied 
territories. Concretely this would mean 
banning imports of settlement products 
(rather than merely labelling them), moni-
toring the implementation of differentia-
tion measures, and preparing a code of 
conduct for European businesses that also 
tackles investments and ventures indirectly 
linked to settlement activities. 
In connection with development projects 
in Area C of the West Bank, Germany and 
its partners in the EU should rethink their 
cooperation with the Israeli Civil Adminis-
tration, which lends legitimacy to Israel’s 
permit system for Palestinian construction 
projects, ongoing restrictions on Palestin-
ian rights and the occupation regime as such. 
In addition to consistent differentiation, 
EU member states should also urgently dis-
cuss which positive and negative incentives 
are required and appropriate in order to in-
fluence the cost/benefit calculations of the 
Israeli government and counteract the main-
tenance and entrenchment of the occu-
pation. 
A new paradigm for Gaza: Given the esca-
lation of the humanitarian situation in 
Gaza and the acute danger of renewed vio-
lence, Germany and its EU partners should 
not abandon conflict management to the 
regional actors once more. Instead, beyond 
alleviating the current crisis, they should 
press for an end to the blockade. This will 
require a paradigm shift. It will not be 
enough to make the GRM less susceptible 
to corruption. Instead the rights of Gaza’s 
population to protection and development 
must be given priority over the security 
interests of the occupying power. In addi-
tion to the negotiation of a long-term cease-
fire, an arrangement that allows for move-
ment of persons and goods and serves the 
needs of the population must be found if 
the situation in the Gaza Strip is to be last-
ingly improved. Gazans must also be granted 
unrestricted access to Gaza’s agricultural 
land and coastal waters. This will mean 
pressing the occupying power to fulfil its 
responsibilities, committing the PA to pur-
sue constructive policies towards Gaza, and 
involving the de facto government in con-
crete arrangements. 
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